Who is calling the API: a key (with its owner and effective scopes), a person's live browser session or linked Telegram chat (in process, PhoenixKit.API.Executor.execute_as/5) or an anonymous public caller.

• kind - :key for a verified bearer key, :user for a live session or a linked Telegram chat, :anonymous for a public caller.
• source - the channel a :user acts through: "telegram" for a linked Telegram chat, nil for a live session (and for every other kind).
• key_uuid, key_prefix - the key, when there is one (nil for :user).
• user_uuid - the key's owner, or the session's (or linked chat's) user.
• scopes - the key's effective scopes (its own, filtered by the owner's live permissions), or the scopes the session's scope holds (PhoenixKit.API.Keys.held_scopes_of/1).
• scope - the PhoenixKit.Users.Auth.Scope those scopes were computed from: the owner's Scope.for_user(owner, narrow: false) for a key, the session's narrowed scope for :user (the user's default role's, for a linked chat too), nil for an anonymous caller. Handlers read it as ctx.scope.
• personal - the key is a personal one (PhoenixKit.API.Keys.Key's personal): its owner's right to personal keys was checked when the actor was built. PhoenixKit.API.Keys.effective_scopes/1 checks it again for an old actor. false for every other actor.
• requires_approval - every write call of the key (not a read, not a dry_run) waits for a human, dangerous or not.
• client_token_hash - the hash of the client token an anonymous public caller sent in the field its tool declares (PhoenixKit.API.Tool's :client_token); nil when the tool declares none or the caller sent none. The raw token is never kept.
• ip - the address the request came from, as a string.

The default is the least-privileged value: anonymous, no scopes, not personal, no approval.

inspect/1 leaves scope out: it holds the user (email, name), and the actor sits in conn.assigns on every API request, where error reports and debug pages print it.